Files
libmicrohttpd/src/daemon/https/x509/x509_verify.c
T
2008-10-13 02:03:03 +00:00

1019 lines
28 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Free Software Foundation
*
* Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
*
* This file is part of GNUTLS.
*
* The GNUTLS library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
* the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
* USA
*
*/
/* All functions which relate to X.509 certificate verification stuff are
* included here
*/
#include <gnutls_int.h>
#include <gnutls_errors.h>
#include <gnutls_cert.h>
#include <libtasn1.h>
#include <gnutls_global.h>
#include <gnutls_num.h> /* MAX */
#include <gnutls_sig.h>
#include <gnutls_str.h>
#include <gnutls_datum.h>
#include <dn.h>
#include <x509.h>
#include <mpi.h>
#include <common.h>
#include <verify.h>
static int MHD__gnutls_verify_certificate2 (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t *
trusted_cas, int tcas_size,
unsigned int flags,
unsigned int *output);
int MHD__gnutls_x509_verify_signature (const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * signed_data,
const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * signature,
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer);
static
int is_crl_issuer (MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_t crl,
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer_cert);
static int MHD__gnutls_verify_crl2 (MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_t crl,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t * trusted_cas,
int tcas_size, unsigned int flags,
unsigned int *output);
/* Checks if the issuer of a certificate is a
* Certificate Authority, or if the certificate is the same
* as the issuer (and therefore it doesn't need to be a CA).
*
* Returns true or false, if the issuer is a CA,
* or not.
*/
static int
check_if_ca (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer, unsigned int flags)
{
MHD_gnutls_datum_t cert_signed_data = { NULL,
0
};
MHD_gnutls_datum_t issuer_signed_data = { NULL,
0
};
MHD_gnutls_datum_t cert_signature = { NULL,
0
};
MHD_gnutls_datum_t issuer_signature = { NULL,
0
};
int result;
/* Check if the issuer is the same with the
* certificate. This is added in order for trusted
* certificates to be able to verify themselves.
*/
result = MHD__gnutls_x509_get_signed_data (issuer->cert, "tbsCertificate",
&issuer_signed_data);
if (result < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
result = MHD__gnutls_x509_get_signed_data (cert->cert, "tbsCertificate",
&cert_signed_data);
if (result < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
result = MHD__gnutls_x509_get_signature (issuer->cert, "signature",
&issuer_signature);
if (result < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
result =
MHD__gnutls_x509_get_signature (cert->cert, "signature", &cert_signature);
if (result < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
/* If the subject certificate is the same as the issuer
* return true.
*/
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DO_NOT_ALLOW_SAME))
if (cert_signed_data.size == issuer_signed_data.size)
{
if ((memcmp (cert_signed_data.data, issuer_signed_data.data,
cert_signed_data.size) == 0) && (cert_signature.size
==
issuer_signature.size)
&&
(memcmp
(cert_signature.data, issuer_signature.data,
cert_signature.size) == 0))
{
result = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_get_ca_status (issuer, NULL) == 1)
{
result = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
else
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
result = 0;
cleanup:MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&cert_signed_data);
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&issuer_signed_data);
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&cert_signature);
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&issuer_signature);
return result;
}
/* This function checks if 'certs' issuer is 'issuer_cert'.
* This does a straight (DER) compare of the issuer/subject fields in
* the given certificates.
*
* Returns 1 if they match and zero if they don't match. Otherwise
* a negative value is returned to indicate error.
*/
static int
is_issuer (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer_cert)
{
MHD_gnutls_datum_t dn1 = { NULL,
0
}, dn2 =
{
NULL, 0};
int ret;
ret = MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_get_raw_issuer_dn (cert, &dn1);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
ret = MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_get_raw_dn (issuer_cert, &dn2);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
ret = MHD__gnutls_x509_compare_raw_dn (&dn1, &dn2);
cleanup:MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&dn1);
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&dn2);
return ret;
}
static inline MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t
find_issuer (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t * trusted_cas, int tcas_size)
{
int i;
/* this is serial search.
*/
for (i = 0; i < tcas_size; i++)
{
if (is_issuer (cert, trusted_cas[i]) == 1)
return trusted_cas[i];
}
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return NULL;
}
/*
* Verifies the given certificate again a certificate list of
* trusted CAs.
*
* Returns only 0 or 1. If 1 it means that the certificate
* was successfuly verified.
*
* 'flags': an OR of the MHD_gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumeration.
*
* Output will hold some extra information about the verification
* procedure.
*/
static int
MHD__gnutls_verify_certificate2 (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t * trusted_cas,
int tcas_size,
unsigned int flags, unsigned int *output)
{
MHD_gnutls_datum_t cert_signed_data = { NULL,
0
};
MHD_gnutls_datum_t cert_signature = { NULL,
0
};
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer;
int ret, issuer_version, result;
if (output)
*output = 0;
if (tcas_size >= 1)
issuer = find_issuer (cert, trusted_cas, tcas_size);
else
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
/* issuer is not in trusted certificate
* authorities.
*/
if (issuer == NULL)
{
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return 0;
}
issuer_version = MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (issuer);
if (issuer_version < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return issuer_version;
}
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN) && !((flags
&
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT)
&& issuer_version == 1))
{
if (check_if_ca (cert, issuer, flags) == 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
}
result = MHD__gnutls_x509_get_signed_data (cert->cert, "tbsCertificate",
&cert_signed_data);
if (result < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
result =
MHD__gnutls_x509_get_signature (cert->cert, "signature", &cert_signature);
if (result < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
ret = MHD__gnutls_x509_verify_signature (&cert_signed_data, &cert_signature,
issuer);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
}
else if (ret == 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
/* error. ignore it */
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
ret = 0;
}
/* If the certificate is not self signed check if the algorithms
* used are secure. If the certificate is self signed it doesn't
* really matter.
*/
if (is_issuer (cert, cert) == 0)
{
int sigalg;
sigalg = MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_get_signature_algorithm (cert);
if (((sigalg == GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD2) && !(flags
&
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD2))
|| ((sigalg == GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD5)
&& !(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD5)))
{
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
}
}
result = ret;
cleanup:MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&cert_signed_data);
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&cert_signature);
return result;
}
/**
* MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer - This function checks if the certificate given has the given issuer
* @cert: is the certificate to be checked
* @issuer: is the certificate of a possible issuer
*
* This function will check if the given certificate was issued by the
* given issuer. It will return true (1) if the given certificate is issued
* by the given issuer, and false (0) if not.
*
* A negative value is returned in case of an error.
*
**/
int
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer)
{
return is_issuer (cert, issuer);
}
/* The algorithm used is:
* 1. Check last certificate in the chain. If it is not verified return.
* 2. Check if any certificates in the chain are revoked. If yes return.
* 3. Try to verify the rest of certificates in the chain. If not verified return.
* 4. Return 0.
*
* Note that the return value is an OR of GNUTLS_CERT_* elements.
*
* This function verifies a X.509 certificate list. The certificate list should
* lead to a trusted CA in order to be trusted.
*/
static unsigned int
MHD__gnutls_x509_verify_certificate (const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t *
certificate_list, int clist_size,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t *
trusted_cas, int tcas_size,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_t * CRLs,
int crls_size, unsigned int flags)
{
int i = 0, ret;
unsigned int status = 0, output;
/* Verify the last certificate in the certificate path
* against the trusted CA certificate list.
*
* If no CAs are present returns CERT_INVALID. Thus works
* in self signed etc certificates.
*/
ret = MHD__gnutls_verify_certificate2 (certificate_list[clist_size - 1],
trusted_cas, tcas_size, flags,
&output);
if (ret == 0)
{
/* if the last certificate in the certificate
* list is invalid, then the certificate is not
* trusted.
*/
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
status |= output;
status |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return status;
}
/* Check for revoked certificates in the chain
*/
#ifdef ENABLE_PKI
for (i = 0; i < clist_size; i++)
{
ret = MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_check_revocation (certificate_list[i],
CRLs, crls_size);
if (ret == 1)
{ /* revoked */
status |= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED;
status |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return status;
}
}
#endif
/* Check if the last certificate in the path is self signed.
* In that case ignore it (a certificate is trusted only if it
* leads to a trusted party by us, not the server's).
*/
if (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer (certificate_list[clist_size - 1],
certificate_list[clist_size - 1]) > 0
&& clist_size > 0)
{
clist_size--;
}
/* Verify the certificate path (chain)
*/
for (i = clist_size - 1; i > 0; i--)
{
if (i - 1 < 0)
break;
/* note that here we disable this V1 CA flag. So that no version 1
* certificates can exist in a supplied chain.
*/
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_ANY_X509_V1_CA_CRT))
flags ^= GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT;
if ((ret = MHD__gnutls_verify_certificate2 (certificate_list[i - 1],
&certificate_list[i], 1,
flags, NULL)) == 0)
{
status |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return status;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Reads the digest information.
* we use DER here, although we should use BER. It works fine
* anyway.
*/
static int
decode_ber_digest_info (const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * info,
enum MHD_GNUTLS_HashAlgorithm *hash,
opaque * digest, int *digest_size)
{
ASN1_TYPE dinfo = ASN1_TYPE_EMPTY;
int result;
char str[1024];
int len;
if ((result = MHD__asn1_create_element (MHD__gnutls_getMHD__gnutls_asn (),
"GNUTLS.DigestInfo",
&dinfo)) != ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return MHD_gtls_asn2err (result);
}
result = MHD__asn1_der_decoding (&dinfo, info->data, info->size, NULL);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
MHD__asn1_delete_structure (&dinfo);
return MHD_gtls_asn2err (result);
}
len = sizeof (str) - 1;
result =
MHD__asn1_read_value (dinfo, "digestAlgorithm.algorithm", str, &len);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
MHD__asn1_delete_structure (&dinfo);
return MHD_gtls_asn2err (result);
}
*hash = MHD_gtls_x509_oid2mac_algorithm (str);
if (*hash == MHD_GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN)
{
MHD__gnutls_x509_log ("verify.c: HASH OID: %s\n", str);
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
MHD__asn1_delete_structure (&dinfo);
return GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM;
}
len = sizeof (str) - 1;
result =
MHD__asn1_read_value (dinfo, "digestAlgorithm.parameters", str, &len);
/* To avoid permitting garbage in the parameters field, either the
parameters field is not present, or it contains 0x05 0x00. */
if (!
(result == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND
|| (result == ASN1_SUCCESS && len == 2 && str[0] == 0x05
&& str[1] == 0x00)))
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
MHD__asn1_delete_structure (&dinfo);
return GNUTLS_E_ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
result = MHD__asn1_read_value (dinfo, "digest", digest, digest_size);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
MHD__asn1_delete_structure (&dinfo);
return MHD_gtls_asn2err (result);
}
MHD__asn1_delete_structure (&dinfo);
return 0;
}
/* if hash==MD5 then we do RSA-MD5
* if hash==SHA then we do RSA-SHA
* params[0] is modulus
* params[1] is public key
*/
static int
_pkcs1_rsa_verify_sig (const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * text,
const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * signature,
mpi_t * params, int params_len)
{
enum MHD_GNUTLS_HashAlgorithm hash = MHD_GNUTLS_MAC_UNKNOWN;
int ret;
opaque digest[MAX_HASH_SIZE], md[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
int digest_size;
GNUTLS_HASH_HANDLE hd;
MHD_gnutls_datum_t decrypted;
ret =
MHD_gtls_pkcs1_rsa_decrypt (&decrypted, signature, params, params_len, 1);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* decrypted is a BER encoded data of type DigestInfo
*/
digest_size = sizeof (digest);
if ((ret = decode_ber_digest_info (&decrypted, &hash, digest, &digest_size))
!= 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&decrypted);
return ret;
}
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&decrypted);
if (digest_size != MHD_gnutls_hash_get_algo_len (hash))
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
hd = MHD_gtls_hash_init (hash);
if (hd == NULL)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_HASH_FAILED;
}
MHD_gnutls_hash (hd, text->data, text->size);
MHD_gnutls_hash_deinit (hd, md);
if (memcmp (md, digest, digest_size) != 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED;
}
return 0;
}
/* Verifies the signature data, and returns 0 if not verified,
* or 1 otherwise.
*/
static int
verify_sig (const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * tbs,
const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * signature,
enum MHD_GNUTLS_PublicKeyAlgorithm pk,
mpi_t * issuer_params, int issuer_params_size)
{
switch (pk)
{
case MHD_GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
if (_pkcs1_rsa_verify_sig
(tbs, signature, issuer_params, issuer_params_size) != 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return 0;
}
return 1;
break;
default:
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
/* verifies if the certificate is properly signed.
* returns 0 on failure and 1 on success.
*
* 'tbs' is the signed data
* 'signature' is the signature!
*/
int
MHD__gnutls_x509_verify_signature (const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * tbs,
const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * signature,
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer)
{
mpi_t issuer_params[MAX_PUBLIC_PARAMS_SIZE];
int ret, issuer_params_size, i;
/* Read the MPI parameters from the issuer's certificate.
*/
issuer_params_size = MAX_PUBLIC_PARAMS_SIZE;
ret =
MHD__gnutls_x509_crt_get_mpis (issuer, issuer_params,
&issuer_params_size);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
ret =
verify_sig (tbs, signature,
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm (issuer, NULL),
issuer_params, issuer_params_size);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
}
/* release all allocated MPIs
*/
for (i = 0; i < issuer_params_size; i++)
{
MHD_gtls_mpi_release (&issuer_params[i]);
}
return ret;
}
/* verifies if the certificate is properly signed.
* returns 0 on failure and 1 on success.
*
* 'tbs' is the signed data
* 'signature' is the signature!
*/
int
MHD__gnutls_x509_privkey_verify_signature (const MHD_gnutls_datum_t * tbs,
const MHD_gnutls_datum_t *
signature,
MHD_gnutls_x509_privkey_t issuer)
{
int ret;
ret = verify_sig (tbs, signature, issuer->pk_algorithm, issuer->params,
issuer->params_size);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
}
return ret;
}
/**
* MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_list_verify - This function verifies the given certificate list
* @cert_list: is the certificate list to be verified
* @cert_list_length: holds the number of certificate in cert_list
* @CA_list: is the CA list which will be used in verification
* @CA_list_length: holds the number of CA certificate in CA_list
* @CRL_list: holds a list of CRLs.
* @CRL_list_length: the length of CRL list.
* @flags: Flags that may be used to change the verification algorithm. Use OR of the MHD_gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumerations.
* @verify: will hold the certificate verification output.
*
* This function will try to verify the given certificate list and return its status.
* Note that expiration and activation dates are not checked
* by this function, you should check them using the appropriate functions.
*
* If no flags are specified (0), this function will use the
* basicConstraints (2.5.29.19) PKIX extension. This means that only a certificate
* authority is allowed to sign a certificate.
*
* You must also check the peer's name in order to check if the verified
* certificate belongs to the actual peer.
*
* The certificate verification output will be put in @verify and will be
* one or more of the MHD_gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements bitwise or'd.
* For a more detailed verification status use MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_verify() per list
* element.
*
* GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID: the certificate chain is not valid.
*
* GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED: a certificate in the chain has been revoked.
*
* Returns 0 on success and a negative value in case of an error.
*
**/
int
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_list_verify (const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t * cert_list,
int cert_list_length,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t * CA_list,
int CA_list_length,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_t * CRL_list,
int CRL_list_length,
unsigned int flags, unsigned int *verify)
{
if (cert_list == NULL || cert_list_length == 0)
return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
/* Verify certificate
*/
*verify = MHD__gnutls_x509_verify_certificate (cert_list, cert_list_length,
CA_list, CA_list_length,
CRL_list, CRL_list_length,
flags);
return 0;
}
/**
* MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_verify - This function verifies the given certificate against a given trusted one
* @cert: is the certificate to be verified
* @CA_list: is one certificate that is considered to be trusted one
* @CA_list_length: holds the number of CA certificate in CA_list
* @flags: Flags that may be used to change the verification algorithm. Use OR of the MHD_gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumerations.
* @verify: will hold the certificate verification output.
*
* This function will try to verify the given certificate and return its status.
* The verification output in this functions cannot be GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_VALID.
*
* Returns 0 on success and a negative value in case of an error.
*
**/
int
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_verify (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t * CA_list,
int CA_list_length,
unsigned int flags, unsigned int *verify)
{
int ret;
/* Verify certificate
*/
ret = MHD__gnutls_verify_certificate2 (cert, CA_list, CA_list_length, flags,
verify);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_PKI
/**
* MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_check_issuer - This function checks if the CRL given has the given issuer
* @crl: is the CRL to be checked
* @issuer: is the certificate of a possible issuer
*
* This function will check if the given CRL was issued by the
* given issuer certificate. It will return true (1) if the given CRL was issued
* by the given issuer, and false (0) if not.
*
* A negative value is returned in case of an error.
*
**/
int
MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_check_issuer (MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_t cert,
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer)
{
return is_crl_issuer (cert, issuer);
}
/**
* MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_verify - This function verifies the given crl against a given trusted one
* @crl: is the crl to be verified
* @CA_list: is a certificate list that is considered to be trusted one
* @CA_list_length: holds the number of CA certificates in CA_list
* @flags: Flags that may be used to change the verification algorithm. Use OR of the MHD_gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumerations.
* @verify: will hold the crl verification output.
*
* This function will try to verify the given crl and return its status.
* See MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_list_verify() for a detailed description of
* return values.
*
* Returns 0 on success and a negative value in case of an error.
*
**/
int
MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_verify (MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_t crl,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t * CA_list,
int CA_list_length, unsigned int flags,
unsigned int *verify)
{
int ret;
/* Verify crl
*/
ret = MHD__gnutls_verify_crl2 (crl, CA_list, CA_list_length, flags, verify);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/* The same as above, but here we've got a CRL.
*/
static int
is_crl_issuer (MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_t crl, MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer_cert)
{
MHD_gnutls_datum_t dn1 = { NULL, 0 }, dn2 =
{
NULL, 0};
int ret;
ret = MHD__gnutls_x509_crl_get_raw_issuer_dn (crl, &dn1);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
ret = MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_get_raw_dn (issuer_cert, &dn2);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
ret = MHD__gnutls_x509_compare_raw_dn (&dn1, &dn2);
cleanup:
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&dn1);
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&dn2);
return ret;
}
static inline MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t
find_crl_issuer (MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_t crl,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t * trusted_cas, int tcas_size)
{
int i;
/* this is serial search.
*/
for (i = 0; i < tcas_size; i++)
{
if (is_crl_issuer (crl, trusted_cas[i]) == 1)
return trusted_cas[i];
}
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
return NULL;
}
/*
* Returns only 0 or 1. If 1 it means that the CRL
* was successfuly verified.
*
* 'flags': an OR of the MHD_gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumeration.
*
* Output will hold information about the verification
* procedure.
*/
static int
MHD__gnutls_verify_crl2 (MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_t crl,
const MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t * trusted_cas,
int tcas_size, unsigned int flags,
unsigned int *output)
{
/* CRL is ignored for now */
MHD_gnutls_datum_t crl_signed_data = { NULL, 0 };
MHD_gnutls_datum_t crl_signature = { NULL, 0 };
MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer;
int ret, result;
if (output)
*output = 0;
if (tcas_size >= 1)
issuer = find_crl_issuer (crl, trusted_cas, tcas_size);
else
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
/* issuer is not in trusted certificate
* authorities.
*/
if (issuer == NULL)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN))
{
if (MHD_gnutls_x509_crt_get_ca_status (issuer, NULL) != 1)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
}
result =
MHD__gnutls_x509_get_signed_data (crl->crl, "tbsCertList",
&crl_signed_data);
if (result < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
result =
MHD__gnutls_x509_get_signature (crl->crl, "signature", &crl_signature);
if (result < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
ret =
MHD__gnutls_x509_verify_signature (&crl_signed_data, &crl_signature,
issuer);
if (ret < 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
}
else if (ret == 0)
{
MHD_gnutls_assert ();
/* error. ignore it */
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
ret = 0;
}
{
int sigalg;
sigalg = MHD_gnutls_x509_crl_get_signature_algorithm (crl);
if (((sigalg == GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD2) &&
!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD2)) ||
((sigalg == GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD5) &&
!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD5)))
{
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
}
}
result = ret;
cleanup:
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&crl_signed_data);
MHD__gnutls_free_datum (&crl_signature);
return result;
}
#endif